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 PREFACE 
 
 
The verifiability principle was the characteristic claim of  
a group of thinkers who called themselves the Vienna 
Circle and who formed the philosophical movement  
now known as logical positivism. The verifiability principle 
is an empiricist criterion of meaning which declares  
that only statements that are verifiable by —i.e., logically 
deducible from— observational statements are cognitively 
meaningful. 
 
This essay is a short introduction to the philosophical 
movement of logical positivism and its formulation of the 
verifiability principle. Its primary aim is to provide 
students of philosophy with an accessible first overview of 
this philosophical movement. 
 
After pointing out some aspects of the philosophical 
background of logical positivism (section 1), I will 
comment on the reasoning that lead these authors to 
formulate the verifiability principle (section 2), and I will 
analyse the debate about how to understand observational 
language and how observational statements (the so-called 
‘protocol statements’) are verified (section 3). I will also 
comment on the two main consequences of accepting the 
verifiability principle: the conception of philosophy as the 
task of logical analysis and the project of unified science 
(section 4), and I will explain the different views on ethical 
language defended by logical positivists (section 5). I will 
end this essay by identifying the main problems of the 
verifiability principle and I will explain the core ideas of 
Carnap’s confirmability criterion, which attempts to 
resolve these problems (section 6 and 7). 
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1. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
The Vienna Circle was a group of thinkers that 
congregated around professor Moritz Schlick in Vienna 
and who formed the philosophical movement now known 
as logical positivism. While I will use these two terms 
indistinctly in this essay, it is interesting to point out that 
some of the thinkers preferred to call themselves logical 
positivists to reflect the fact that their philosophy was 
simply the “[...] convergence of two significant traditions: 
the positivistic-empirical and the logical” (Blumberg and 
Feigl 1931, p. 281). Others, however, preferred the term 
‘Vienna Circle’, since ‘logical positivism’ might wrongly 
suggest “[...] too close a dependence upon the older 
Positivists, especially Comte and Mach” (Carnap 1936, p. 
422).  
 
Their philosophical activity began around 1924 when 
Schlick, who is considered as “[...] the founder and leader 
of the Vienna Circle” (Feigl 1969, p. 21), took up a Chair 
at the University of Vienna. Curiously enough, none of the 
members of the Vienna Circle considered themselves to be 
“pure philosophers” (Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, 
p. 304), while they all declared that they had the same 
philosophical orientation —i.e., “a scientific conception of 
the world”. (Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, p. 304) 
 
The common element among the members of  
the Vienna Circle was their acceptance of the so-called 
verifiability principle, which declares that the  
cognitive content of a statement is its method of  
verification —i.e., the conditions under which the state-
ment is logically deducible from observational statements. 
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As we will see later, these authors held different views on 
how to understand observational language and how 
observational statements (the so-called ‘protocol 
statements’) are verified, even while they all unquestionably 
accepted the verifiability principle. 
 
Although most of its members were still active for 
some years after, the end of the Vienna Circle as a 
philosophical movement can be dated to 1936. The rise of 
National Socialism and Europe’s political instability in the 
30’s forced the Circle to disperse: Schlick was murdered by 
a student and most of its members emigrated from Vienna. 
Additionally, by the mid 30’s it had become clear that the 
verifiability principle was too narrow to be a successful 
criterion for cognitive meaning, given that it deemed as 
nonsensical statements that are clearly meaningful. The 
publication of “Testability and Meaning” by Carnap in 
1936 marked a point of departure from the original 
philosophical position of the Vienna Circle —although not 
from its philosophical orientation— since it can be 
considered as the first serious attempt to liberalise the 
verifiability principle. This is why it is important to 
distinguish between the classical, Viennese formulation of 
the verifiability principle, which takes verifiability to be a 
matter of logical deduction from observational statements, 
and the liberalised versions of the verifiability principle, 
which discard conceiving verifiability as logical deduction 
and make inductive inference from observational 
statements the requirement for cognitive meaning. In this 
essay, I will focus on the classical, Viennese formulation of 
the verifiability principle. 
 
A clear precedent of the verifiability principle is 
classical empiricism, since the intuition behind the 
verifiability principle is none other than the empiricists’ 
claim that the state of affairs expressed by a proposition 
must, in the end, be grounded in our experience  
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(cf., e.g., Schlick 1932–33, p. 86–87). The influence of 
classical empiricism was explicitly recognised by logical 
positivists (cf., e.g., Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 281; Hahn, 
Neurath and Carnap 1929, p. 304); Ayer, whose Language, 
Truth and Logic (1936) is often taken as the paradigmatic 
formulation of logical positivism in the English language, 
even goes as far as to say that “[...] I sometimes think of 
Language, Truth and Logic itself as being no more than 
Hume in modern dress” (Ayer 1987, p. 23). It is indeed 
easy to find this verificationist tendency in Hume’s work:  
 
 When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a 
philosophical term is employed without any 
meaning or ideas (as is but too frequent), we need 
but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea 
derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this 
will serve to confirm our suspicion. (Hume, 
1748/1999, p.99, emph. of the author) 
 
It is also interesting to point out that the logical 
positivist’s concern with clarifying our concepts and 
freeing philosophy from merely verbal disputes was 
already present in classical empiricism —consider, for 
example, Berkeley’s claim that 
 
 It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone 
would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear 
view of the ideas he would consider, separating 
from them all that dress and incumbrance of 
words which so much contribute to blind the 
judgment and divide the attention. (Berkeley, 
1710/2003, Intr. §24) 
 
Berkeley, in fact, deserves special attention. His 
objection to the meaningfulness of the notion of material 
substance (Berkeley, 1710/2003, I §16–17) clearly shows 
his verificationist tendency. His claim that we can reach a 
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relative notion of spiritual substance (Berkeley, 1710/2003, 
I §27), however, seems to reveal that he did not take 
complete verification —i.e., logical deduction from 
statements about ideas of experience or sense-data— as a 
requirement for cognitive meaning. 
 
Apart from empiricism, logical positivism’s other major 
influence was the development in the study of logic that 
came about at the beginning of the XX century, in 
particular through the works of Frege, Whitehead, Russell 
and Wittgenstein, and this was explicitly recognised by 
logical positivists (cf., e.g., Ayer 1959, p. 5; Ayer 1987, p. 
24–25; Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 282; Carnap 1928a, p. 
vi; Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, p. 308; Schlick 1936, 
p. 341). Schlick himself, for example, said that 
Wittgenstein was the first to see “with absolute clearness” 
(Schlick 1930, p. 172) that the task of philosophy was 
logical analysis, marking “the beginning of a new era in 
philosophy” (Schlick 1930, p. 172). Later, I will explain in 
more detail what this new way of approaching philosophy 
consisted of; for the moment, I simply want to draw 
attention to the fact that this conceiving philosophy as 
‘philosophizing’, as the activity that aims to clarify our 
concepts through logical analysis, is one of the most 
distinctive aspects of the philosophy of the Vienna Circle 
and can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s claim in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that  
 
 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of 
thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but 
an activity. A philosophical work consists 
essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not 
result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in 
the clarification of propositions. (Wittgenstein 
1921/2002, §4.112) 
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Last, apart from the verifiability principle there were 
other criteria of meaning which were considered as 
empiricist, principally operationalism (cf., e.g., Bridgmann 
1928) and pragmatism (cf., e.g., James 1907a; James 1907b). 
Some logical positivists later declared that they had been 
unaware of these other criteria in the 30’s (Feigl 1969, p. 
22); however, others were clearly already aware of the 
existence of pragmatism and operationalism during this 
period (cf., Carnap 1936, p. 427–428; Lewis 1934,  
p. 125–126; Schlick 1931, p. 196). What all these criteria, 
including the verifiability principle, have in common is that 
in one way or another they all aim to retain the empiricist 
intuition that a statement not linked to experience is 
somehow vacuous; their differences lie in the various ways 
they understand this required connection with experience. 
Operationalism, which states that a scientific concept is 
defined by the operations through which it is measured 
(Bridgman 1928, p. 36), is clearly like the verifiability 
principle, to the extent that some years later Carnap wrote 
that they only differed “[...] in minor details and in 
emphasis” (Carnap 1956, p. 65). With pragmatism, 
however, the differences are evident. Pragmatism, at least 
in its classical, Jamesian formulation, aims to preserve the 
connection with the observable through what James called 
the “practical cash-value” of the belief in question —i.e., its 
“[...] value for concrete life” (James 1907b, p. 72–73). 
Provided he did not deny that truth is a relation of 
agreement of our ideas with reality (James 1907a, p. 198),  
he felt free to conclude that pragmatism represented “the 
empiricist temper regnant” (James 1907b, p. 51). It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that here James is 
using a peculiar notion of ‘agreement with reality’: an idea 
agrees with reality when it “[...] helps us to deal, whether 
practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its 
belongings [...] and adapts our life to the reality’s whole 
setting [...]” (James 1907a, p. 213, the author’s emphasis). 
Clearly, what James called “the practical cash-value” has 
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nothing to do with logical positivists’ claim that the 
connection with the observable is only due to verifiability, 
the relation of logical deductibility from observational 
statements.  
  
2. THE FORMULATION OF THE 
VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE 
 
 
 
In the formulation of the verifiability principle we can 
distinguish, at least dialectically, three different steps. First, 
identifying the cognitive meaning of a statement with the 
state of affairs described by it; second, identifying the state 
of affairs described by a statement with its truth-conditions 
—i.e., with the state of affairs that would make it true—; 
and third, identifying truth-conditions with the method of 
verification —i.e., the conditions under which the 
description of a state of affairs is logically deducible from 
observational statements. In their formulations of the 
verifiability principle, most logical positivists carried out 
these three steps. It must be remembered, however, that 
the first two steps are neither specific nor original claims 
of logical positivism, and that neither of them by 
themselves implies the verifiability principle; in fact, they 
are quite intuitive and so it is difficult to reject them. 
Nonetheless, once these two first steps were taken, logical 
positivists felt free to go further and formulate the 
verifiability principle —i.e., that the cognitive meaning of a 
statement is the conditions under which the statement is 
logically deducible from observational statements.   
 
Thus, logical positivists argued that the cognitive 
content of a statement is the expression of a state of affairs 
(cf., e.g., Carnap 1928b, p. 325). This seems hard to deny: 
the cognitive content of the statement ‘There is one beer 
in the fridge’ is the state of affairs in which there is one 
beer in the fridge. This by itself, though, has nothing to do 
with the verifiability principle.  
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Logical positivists claimed that we cannot understand 
what state of affairs is expressed by a proposition unless 
we are able to state its truth-conditions, which happens 
when that state of affairs occurs. Logical positivists thereby 
identified the cognitive content of a statement —i.e., the 
state of affairs expressed by it— with the truth-conditions 
of that statement —i.e., the state of affairs that would 
make the state of affairs expressed by that statement true. 
Identifying the cognitive content of a statement with its 
truth-conditions seems, at least intuitively, hard to deny; 
but, again, this by itself has nothing to do with the 
verifiability principle. This second step is well summarised 
by Schlick: 
 
[...] that it is simply impossible to give the meaning 
of any statement except by describing the fact 
which must exist if the statement is false. The 
meaning of a proposition consists, obviously, in 
this alone, that it expresses a definite state of 
affairs. (Schlick 1932/33, p. 86–7; cf., also Ayer 
1934, p. 337; Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 288). 
 
Last, and here we can see the real empiricist 
contribution and the influence that this development in the 
study of logic had on logical positivism, the members of 
the Vienna Circle argued that we can only know what the 
truth-conditions of a statement are if we are able to state 
the observable facts that would make it true; in other 
words, if we are able to state its verification, from which 
observational statements would be logically deducible.  
This idea is clearly expressed by Carnap:  
 
A person S tests (verifies) a system-sentence by 
deducing from it sentences of his own protocol 
language, and comparing these sentences with 
those of his actual protocol. The possibility of 
such a deduction of protocol sentences constitutes 
An Introduction to Logical Positivism 
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the content of a sentence. If a sentence permits no 
such deductions, it has no content, and is 
meaningless. If the same sentences may be 
deduced from two sentences, the latter two 
sentences have the same content. They say the 
same thing, and may be translated into one 
another. (Carnap 1931, p. 166, emph. of the 
author; cf., also: Ayer 1934, p. 337; Carnap 1928b, 
p. 327; Schlick 1932/33, p. 87–88). 
 
Thus, all cognitively meaningful statements are logically 
deducible from these observational statements, which were 
called protocol or basic statements and which, at least in 
the first stages of the formulation of the verifiability 
principle, were taken to provide the foundations of all our 
knowledge. As I will explain in the next section, the main 
point of debate among the members of the Vienna Circle 
was how observational language should be understood, 
either in a physicalist way or as a perceptual-language, a 
debate that is closely related to this alleged foundational 
nature of protocol statements and the way in which they 
are supposed to be verified. To understand observational 
language in a physicalist way is to claim that observational 
statements can be expressed in physicalist terms without 
any loss in meaning, whereas to understand observational 
language as a perceptual-language is to assert that 
observational statements can be expressed in perceptual 
terms, also without any loss in meaning.  
 
Once the cognitive meaning of a statement has been 
identified with its method of verification, there can be two 
important outcomes. First, all the statements that fail to 
satisfy the verifiability principle —i.e., that cannot be 
logically deduced from the set of observational 
statements— are taken to be cognitively meaningless. As 
we will see in detail later, this would imply the dissolution 
of metaphysics, in so far as this is taken by logical 
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positivists as a discipline that is only capable of producing 
“isolated sentences” (Hempel 1965, p. 114), sentences that 
are not logically linked with observational statements. 
Second, if two statements are logically deducible from the 
same observational statements, then despite possibly 
differing in form they have the same cognitive meaning, 
they posit the same state of affairs (e.g., ‘Madrid is 720km 
south of Barcelona’ and ‘Barcelona is 720km north of 
Madrid’). Since the verifiability principle is a criterion  
only for cognitive meaning, logical positivists could  
claim that two statements that share the same cognitive 
content —i.e., they are both logically deducible from the 
same set of observational statements— might differ with 
regards to their non-cognitive, evaluative or aesthetic 
content. Thus, for example, the difference between ‘My 
father’s wife is on the phone’ and ‘My step mum is on the 
phone’ is not explained by any difference in their cognitive 
content, but in the different evaluative charge of the 
expressions ‘My father’s wife’ and ‘My step mum’.   
 
An important point must now be made: the verifiability 
principle requires that we are able to state what the truth-
conditions of a statement are, but not what its truth-value 
is. In other words, we must be able to know how the 
statement could be deduced from protocol statements, but 
not whether the statement is actually deduced or not. What 
is required to have cognitive meaning is that the statement 
is verifiable, not that it is (now and by us) verified 
(Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 296; Carnap 1928a, p. 290; 
Feigl 1934, p. 422). This is what Schlick tries to capture 
with his distinction between the empirical possibility and the 
logical possibility of verifying a statement (Schlick 1935b, 
p. 415–417; Schlick 1936, p. 351 and passim). It may be 
empirically impossible to verify a certain statement (due to 
empirical facts like our own human nature, our technical 
limitations or the natural laws of our world), but there 
could still be the logical possibility of verifying it —i.e., we 
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can still indicate how the statement must be deduced from 
observational statements if it were to be true. With this 
distinction, the verifiability principle seems to be able to 
accommodate statements that, while they cannot be 
verified by us now, clearly posit an observable state of 
affairs. Since in the 30’s the possibility of travelling to the 
moon was not taken as a logical possibility, the canonical 
examples of such statements given by logical positivists 
were statements about the other side of the moon 
(e.g., ‘There are two volcanoes on the other side of the 
moon’). In Schlick’s words: 
 
 For the question ‘What is the other side of the 
moon like?’, could be answered, for instance, by a 
description of what would be seen and touched by 
a person located somewhere behind the moon. 
The question whether it be physically possible for 
a human being —or indeed any other living 
being— to travel around the moon does not even 
have to be raised here; it is entirely irrelevant. 
Even if it could be shown that a journey to 
another celestial body were absolutely 
incompatible with the known laws of nature, a 
proposition about the other side of the moon 
would still be meaningful. (Schlick 1936, p. 354)1 
 
Logical positivists’ treatment of logic and mathematical 
statements deserves special attention. Since it was agreed 
that such statements could be neither refuted nor proved 
by observational statements, logical positivists did not 
                                                          
1 It is interesting to point out here that according to Schlick, natural 
laws are empirical facts: “Even if the impossibility of solving a certain 
question is due to a Law of Nature, we shall have to say that it is only 
empirical, not logical, provided we can indicate how the law would have 
to be changed in order to make the question answerable. After all, the 
existence of any law of Nature must be considered as an empirical fact 
which might just as well be different” (Schlick, 1935b, p. 416). 
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consider them as empirical statements. This committed 
these authors to claiming that logic and mathematical 
statements are cognitively meaningless, since they cannot 
satisfy the verifiability principle (cf., e.g., Ayer 1946/1971,  
p. 100–102; Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 288; Carnap 
1939, p. 61). The problem is that one cannot simply  
say that such statements are completely meaningless:  
in one way or another, they seem to provide  
knowledge. In response, logical positivists maintained  
that logic and mathematical claims were a matter of 
analyticity —i.e., statements that do not describe the world, 
although they do “serve for the transformation” of 
cognitive statements, and which are true or false only by 
virtue of their meaning (Carnap 1932a, p. 76). 
 
In taking this route, these authors were led to the 
question of what ‘analyticity’ meant and there were 
different attempts among logical positivists to explain this. 
Ayer, for example, claimed that “[...] a proposition is 
analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions 
of the symbols it contains [...]” (Ayer 1946/1971, p. 105) 
and he argued that analytic statements, while devoid of 
cognitive content, are not nonsensical since they give us 
new knowledge by bringing the implications of our 
linguistic usage to light (Ayer 1946/1971, p. 105–106). 
Moreover, according to Ayer, although logic and 
mathematical claims are analytic statements, the possibility 
of discovering new logic and mathematical truths is 
allowed since there are linguistic implications that we are 
not able to detect at a glance because we do not have an 
all-powerful mind (Ayer 1946/1971, p. 114). 
 
I do not intend to enter into debate about the adequacy 
of this account of analyticity; the point I would like to 
make here is that although logical positivists (in so far as 
they embraced a tautological account of mathematical and 
logical statements) were committed to accounting for the 
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statements that made them meaningful but devoid of 
cognitive content, this does not imply that they were 
committed to a particular account of analyticity. In other 
words, while they were committed to accommodating the 
statements that were assumed to be non-cognitively 
significant but still meaningful, they were not committed 
to a particular way of doing so. Thus, even if as Quine 
argued in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) we 
lack a successful account of analyticity, strictly speaking 
this would not constitute a knock-down argument against 
the verifiability principle (although, it could be said to 
diminish its plausibility): it could always be argued that 
there is an explanation lacking, which we must find.  
 
 
  
3. OBSERVATIONAL LANGUAGE AND 
THE EPISTEMIC PRIMACY OF 
PROTOCOL STATEMENTS 
 
 
 
The question as to how to understand observational lan-
guage was the main point of debate among the members 
of the Vienna Circle (Ayer 1987, p. 26). This debate is 
important, partially because it shows that the Vienna Circle 
was not a completely uniform movement, but mainly be-
cause the question as to how to understand observational 
language soon turned into debate about the foundations of 
knowledge and the notion of truth. In fact, as we will see, 
this debate is highly interesting since it reveals the internal 
difficulties that arise if we want to take the verifiability 
principle as a criterion for cognitive meaning: if we take 
observational language to be some kind of perceptual-
language, it seems that we are steered to solipsism and the 
problem of private language, whereas if we take observa-
tional language to be a physicalist-language, apart from 
being committed to providing a physicalist account of 
psychological language (which seems to be problematic, at 
least in the behaviouristic terms that logical positivists tried 
to use), we are forced to adopt a coherentist view about 
truth and hence give up the empiricist’s chief claim that all 
our knowledge is grounded in experience. 
 
The view that all observational statements can be ex-
pressed in perceptual terms seems to fit well with the claim 
that all cognitively meaningful statements are tested by 
being verified through —i.e., logically deduced from— 
protocol statements, whereas protocol statements are di-
rectly tested by being faced with the given, the content of 
our sense-experience (Ayer 1936/37, p. 229; Schlick 1935a, 
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p. 404). Hence, protocol statements are to provide the 
foundations of all our knowledge, since they are taken as 
the atomic facts of our language, the ultimate objects of 
the truth-functions of all our cognitively meaningful 
statements (Schlick 1934, p. 213 and 221). 
 
Neurath, the chief advocate of the physicalist  
approach –i.e., the claim that observational language is 
expressible in a physical language— argued that observa-
tional language cannot be understood as a perceptual-lan-
guage.2 First, because if observational language is taken to 
be a perceptual-language, then we are committed to 
solipsism, since observational language becomes “[...] a 
purely subjective one, suitable for soliloquy only [...]” 
(Carnap 1937, p. 11; cf., also Neurath 1932, p. 96–97). And 
second, because to say that a statement can be directly 
tested through facing it in order to sense-experience it is to 
make a metaphysical (hence, meaningless) assertion: if 
verifiability is to be identified with the procedure of logical 
deductibility, it cannot involve anything other than state-
ments, since only statements are subject to logical analysis 
(Neurath 1931/32, p. 292–293).3 In Neurath’s words: 
 
 Language is essential for science; within language 
all transformations of science take place, not by 
confrontation of language with a ‘world’, a totality 
of ‘things’ whose variety language is supposed to 
reflect. An attempt like that would be metaphysics. 
The one scientific language can speak about itself, one part 
                                                          
2 Do not confuse physicalism with materialism: physicalism is a 
thesis about the nature of observational language, not a metaphysical 
claim about the nature of things. In Neurath's words: “Physicalism does 
not hold the thesis that ‘mind’ is a product of ‘matter’ but that 
everything we can sensibly talk about is spatially and temporarily 
ordered” (Neurath, 1931a, p. 325).  
3 This was denied by Ayer (Ayer 1963, p. 185-186), who contested 
that there is nothing mysterious in directly comparing our protocol 
statements with the content of our experience. 
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of language can speak about the other; it is impossible to 
turn back behind or before language. (Neurath 
1931b, p. 54, emph. of the author).   
 
Thus, there can be no direct verification of protocol 
statements about our own sensory-experience through 
confronting them with the content of our sensory-
experience: our statements can only be tested through 
being verified —i.e., logically deduced from— other state-
ments. According to Neurath, this explains why we are 
committed to adopting a coherentist view about truth: 
when assessing the truth of a new statement, we might 
consider it true when it is not in contradiction with the rest 
of our already accepted statements (Neurath 1931b, p. 53; 
Neurath 1931/32, p. 291; Neurath 1932, p. 94–95). Con-
sequently, no statements are more basic or fundamental 
than others: all statements are of equal value and hence no 
set of statements can provide the foundations of our 
knowledge. This coherentist view about truth is well 
summarised by Neurath when he claims that: 
 
 In unified science, we try [...] to create a consistent 
system of protocol statements and non-protocol 
statements (including laws). When a new state-
ment is presented to us we compare it with the 
system at our disposal and check whether the new 
statement is in contradiction with the system or 
not. If the new statement is in contradiction with 
the system, we can discard this statement as unus-
able (‘false’), for example, the statement: ‘In Africa 
lions sing only in major chords’; however, one can 
also ‘accept’ the statement and change the system 
accordingly so that it remains consistent if this 
statement is added. The statement may then be 
called ‘true’. (Neurath 1932, p. 94–95, emph. of 
the author).  
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The first problem of physicalism is that it forgets about 
the supposed epistemic primacy and the incorrigibility of 
protocol statements about our own sensory-experience: I 
take to be epistemically superior the statements with which 
I express my own perceptions than those with which you 
express yours, to the extent that whereas I can doubt your 
perceptual reports, I cannot doubt mine. As Schlick says: 
 
If all the scientists in the world told me that under 
certain experimental conditions I must see three 
black spots, and if under those conditions I saw 
only one spot, no power in the universe could 
induce me to think that the statement ‘there is 
now only one black spot in the field of vision’ is 
false (Schlick 1935a, p. 404; cf. also Ayer 1936/37, 
p. 243; Schlick 1934, p. 218–219).  
 
The physicalist responds by claiming that although they 
can be distinguished in the physicalist language (Carnap 
1932b, p. 468), protocol statements cannot be mine or yours, 
since the notion of subject is a metaphysical (hence, 
meaningless) notion —a “chimerical epistemological 
subject”, as Feigl says (Feigl 1934, p. 429). The supposed 
epistemic primacy of the protocol statements I take to be 
mine is due to pure practical convenience related to 
psychological (contingent) traits of our human nature 
(cf., e.g., Carnap 1932b, p. 467; Neurath 1932, p. 97). More 
specifically, we can reconstruct their argument as follows. 
The notion of a subject that owns sensory-experience is not 
verifiable —i.e., it is not logically deducible from any set of 
observational statements— and hence it is a meaningless 
notion. This argument is clearly expressed by Wittgenstein: 
 
 5. 631. There is no such thing as the subject that 
thinks or entertains ideas. [...] 
5.632. The subject does not belong to the world: 
rather, it is a limit of the world. 
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5.633. Where in the world is a metaphysical 
subject to be found? You will say that this is 
exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. 
But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in 
the visual field allows you to infer that is seen by an 
eye. (Wittgenstein 1922/2002, §5.631–5.633, 
emph. of the author). 
 
These considerations lead logical positivists to claim 
that the content of sensory-experience is neutral, that it has 
no owner. However, this was not taken to mean that there 
is no difference between statements such as ‘I am hungry’, 
on the one hand, and ‘He is hungry’, on the other. As 
Schlick argued (Schlick 1936, p. 367), we can say that the 
content of the experiences that seem to affect us have an 
owner to the extent that their content is related to the 
content of the other sensory-experiences that constitute 
what each of us would call ‘my body’. This, however, is an 
empirical, contingent relation. The logical positivists that 
favoured a physicalist account of observational language 
thought that this relation could be captured by physicalist 
language: thus, although I cannot say that there are 
protocol statements which are mine, I can distinguish ‘I-
protocol’ from ‘He-protocol’. The point is nicely 
summarised by Neurath: 
 
In the universal jargony [i.e., physicalist language] 
one cannot speak meaningfully of one’s ‘own’ 
protocol, nor of ‘now’ and ‘here’. In the physicalist 
language, personal names are replaced by 
coordinates and coefficients of physical states. 
One can only distinguish an ‘Otto-protocol’ from 
a ‘Karl-protocol’ but, in the universal jargon, not 
one’s ‘own protocol’ from ‘another’s protocol’. 
The whole problematic connected with one’s ‘own 
mind’ and ‘other minds’ does not arise. (Neurath 
1932, p. 97, the text inside brackets is mine). 
Alberto Oya 
20 
I will not go into further detail, but it is interesting to 
note that giving a physicalist account of observational 
language commits us to adopting a physicalist account of 
psychological language, which is (at least in the 
behaviouristic terms that logical positivists used) (cf., e.g., 
Feigl 1934, p. 438; Carnap 1931; Neurath 1931/32, p. 292–
293) highly problematic. Defending a physicalist account 
of psychological language commits us to giving a 
behaviouristic account of first-person psychological 
statements —i.e., when I say ‘I feel sad’, what I am really 
referring to is my feeling-sad behaviour, not my feeling-
sad; and here it could be argued that even if I learn how to 
use mentalistic language based on physicalist, 
behaviouristic language, when I employ mentalistic 
language what I am referring to are my own sensations and 
not my behaviour (Feigl 1960, p. 342–343). 
 
There is a second, stronger objection to Neurath’s 
coherentism, which consists of claiming that the epistemic 
primacy of my own protocol statements does not come 
from the fact that I cannot doubt the perceptual reports 
about my own sensory-experience, but from the more 
fundamental logical role that they play in the process of 
verifying the rest of my cognitive statements. Since 
protocol statements are in the end the statements from 
which the rest of cognitively meaningful statements are 
logically deduced, it seems that we can conclude that they 
have some sort of epistemic primacy. Neurath was aware 
of this possible objection, to which he answered that what 
statements we take to play this more fundamental logical 
role in the process of verification is a matter of 
convention, to be decided “on the basis of extralogical 
factors” (Neurath 1934, p. 106; cf. also: Carnap 1932b, p. 
464–467; Neurath 1932, p. 91). In Neurath’s words: 
 
 When we have removed the [internally] contradic-
tory groups of statements, there still  remain sev-
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eral group of statements with differing protocol 
statements that are equally applicable; that are 
without contradictions in themselves but exclude 
each other. (Neurath 1934, p. 105, the text inside 
brackets is mine).  
 
However, the serious problem is that even if we take 
for granted the fact that what observational statements we 
take to be more fundamental is a matter of convention and 
we assume that there is a convincing physicalist account of 
first-person psychological statements, it is difficult to argue 
that the verifiability principle in the context of Neurath’s 
coherentism is an empiricist criterion for meaning: the 
main intuition behind empiricism is that all our knowledge 
is, in the end, founded on our experience, not on a 
convention. As Carnap says, someone who denies the 
possibility of confirming a statement through its 
confrontation with observation “could not be considered 
an empiricist” (Carnap 1949, p. 126; cf., also Cornelius 
Benjamin 1941, p. 569). Of course, strictly speaking, this 
does not constitute an argument against the adequacy of 
the verifiability principle: one can simply adhere to it by 
accepting that it is not an empiricist criterion. However, it 
does show, first, that the adequacy of the verifiability 
principle cannot be grounded on the strength of empiricist 
intuition and, second, that empiricism cannot be construed 
in physicalist terms.  
 
   
  
4. THE TWO MAIN CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE: 
PHILOSOPHY AS LOGICAL ANALYSIS 
AND THE PROJECT OF UNIFIED 
SCIENCE  
 
 
 
Accepting the verifiability principle brings about two main 
consequences of enormous importance. First, philosophy 
becomes a task of logical analysis, which in turn implies 
eliminating all metaphysical, non-verifiable, and hence 
meaningless, sentences, in addition to dissolving many 
classical philosophical problems that are founded on 
metaphysical, non-verifiable sentences. Second, the 
requirement of there being a unified science: if all 
cognitively meaningful statements are to be logically 
deduced from statements of observational language, then 
all statements with cognitive meaning must, in the end, 
refer to this same observational language. In this section I 
will focus on these two consequences.  
 
 
4.1. Philosophy as Logical Analysis 
 
As I mentioned before, logical positivists themselves  
(cf., e.g., Ayer 1959, p. 23–24; Schlick 1930, p. 172) 
recognised that their understanding of philosophy as the 
task of logical analysis was inherited from Wittgenstein 
(Wittgenstein 1922/2002, §4.122; cf., also Russell 1924, 
p. 47–48). For logical positivists, the task of philosophy 
was not to formulate systems or doctrines, but to dissolve 
traditional philosophical problems through clarifying and 
purifying our language (Feigl 1934, p. 421; Hahn, Neurath 
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and Carnap 1929, p. 306; Neurath 1931b, p. 49; Ramsey 
1931, p. 321; Schlick 1925, p. 91; Schlick 1928, p. 142). 
Thus, their aim was not to offer a philosophical doctrine 
that aimed to solve a philosophical problem, but to show 
by the method of logical analysis (Carnap 1932a, p. 77) 
that the problem was in fact ill-founded.  
 
In understanding philosophy as the task of logical 
analysis, we can distinguish two different aspects of 
philosophical activity. First, there is the task of clarifying 
our concepts through logical analysis, which leads to 
dissolving all merely verbal disputes. Second, there is the 
task of identifying which sentences satisfy the verifiability 
principle and which do not, which leads to dissolving all 
the classical philosophical problems that are founded on 
meaningless sentences. It is important to clearly distinguish 
between these two tasks: whereas the latter is dependent 
on the success of the verifiability principle, the former can 
be accepted even if we reject it. 
 
This conception of philosophy was taken to be so 
radically new that some logical positivists suggested 
eliminating the term ‘philosophy’ in favour of expressions 
such as ‘philosophizing’ (Neurath 1931a, p. 329–330) or 
‘the logic of science’ (Carnap 1934, p. 6). However, there 
were others who did not want to go as far. Schlick, for 
example, preferred to retain the name ‘philosophy’ because 
otherwise it would create the impression that philosophy 
only deals with the language of science, when this is not 
the case, since philosophy also deals with ethics (Schlick 
1937, p. 495–498). 
 
At any rate, it is important to point out that none of the 
logical positivists took the conception of philosophy as the 
task of logical analysis to imply the discrediting of 
philosophy or a denial of its importance; in fact, they  
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thought that this would elevate philosophy to a more 
honoured position. As Schlick says: 
 
 The result of philosophizing will be that no more 
books will be written about philosophy, but that 
all books will be written in a philosophical 
manner. (Schlick 1930, p. 175) 
 
As a consequence of accepting the verifiability princi-
ple, logical positivists declared the elimination of meta-
physics. Metaphysics was to be eliminated, not for being 
useless as classical positivists such as Comte claimed, but 
for being completely meaningless (Blumberg and Feigl 
1931, p. 282; Carnap 1932a, p. 60). Logical positivists un-
derstood metaphysics to be the discipline that deals with 
the transcendent, that which goes beyond the content of 
our experience (Ayer 1934, p. 335; Schlick 1926,  
p. 102–211). If metaphysical sentences talk about that 
which is beyond our experience, then they cannot be 
verified by —i.e., logically deduced from— our 
observational language. Thus, logical positivists claimed 
that by its own definition, metaphysics cannot produce 
cognitively meaningful statements since they cannot satisfy 
the verifiability principle. Thus, metaphysical sentences 
must be regarded as cognitively meaningless expressions, 
as sentences that aimed to describe a state of affairs but 
failed to do so. 
 
This conception of metaphysics was contested by 
Ewing (Ewing 1937, p. 351), who argued that no meta-
physical system aimed to deal with the pure transcendent: any 
metaphysical doctrine is supposed to bear, in some way or 
another, a relation with experience. This could be correct, 
but it does not affect logical positivists’ main objection to 
metaphysics: no metaphysical claim, even if it bears some 
sort of relation with experience, can be logically deduced 
from our observational statements.  
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Anyhow, since the verifiability principle is restricted to 
cognitive meaning, logical positivists were not committed 
to claiming that metaphysical sentences are completely 
meaningless, like a random sequence of letters could be. 
Metaphysical sentences can still have some sort of emotive 
or aesthetic meaning (Ayer 1934, p. 338; Carnap 1932a,  
p. 78; Feigl 1951, p. 145; Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, 
p. 306–307; Neurath 1931a, p. 357; Neurath 1931/32, 
p. 300; Schlick 1926, p. 111; Schlick 1930, p. 174–175). 
With this, metaphysics was equated to poetry: metaphysics 
is allowed if and only if we are aware that it is fiction, a 
mere emotive or aesthetic pastime, but not a description of 
the world.  
 
The result of this was that quite a few classical 
philosophical disputes were taken to be dissolved —i.e., 
showed to be meaningless— since they were grounded  
on what logical positivists took to be metaphysical, 
cognitively meaningless (pseudo)statements. Some of these 
were: the problem of the existence of an external world 
and the dispute between realists and idealists (cf., Barret 
1939; Carnap 1928a, p. 281–286; Carnap 1928b,  
p. 332–339; Feigl 1934, p. 425–426; Feigl 1969, p.25; 
Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, p. 308; Neurath 1931a, 
p. 416–417; Schlick 1932/33, p. 96–105); the problem of 
solipsism (cf., Carnap 1932b, p. 468; Feigl 1934, p. 424; 
Neurath 1932, p. 97–99; Schlick 1936, especially sect. V); 
the mind-body problem (cf., Carnap 1934, p. 18–19; Feigl 
1934; Neurath 1931a, p. 360); and the problem of the 
inverted spectrum (cf., Neurath 1931b, p. 49; Schlick 1926, 
p. 99–102). Schlick went further than other logical 
positivists by claiming the dissolution of causality (Schlick 
1925, p. 96) and the problem of induction (Schlick 1931, p. 
197). Leaving aside the particularities of each of these 
philosophical problems, the important point is, as I have 
already said, that all of them were taken to be ill-founded: 
the problem of the existence of an external world, for 
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example, was taken to be founded in the metaphysical 
(hence, meaningless) notion of the external world as 
something that goes beyond what is given in the 
experience. 
 
 
4.2. The Project of Unified Science 
 
The project of unified science emerges from the 
verifiability principle: if all cognitively meaningful 
statements are to be logically deduced from observational 
language, then the statements of all the sciences that aim to 
have cognitive meaning —i.e., that aim to offer a 
description of how the world is— must be logically deduced 
from this same observational language. This is important: 
the project of unified science is a consequence of the 
verifiability principle, not an addenda. This is explicitly 
recognised by Carnap when he says that: 
 
 All empirical sciences (natural sciences, 
psychology, cultural sciences) acknowledge and 
carry out in practice the requirement that every 
statement must have factual content. It makes no 
difference whether we are concerned with 
mineralogy, biology, or the science of religion: 
each statement which is to be considered 
meaningful in any one of these fields (i.e., which is 
either considered true or false or which is posed as 
a question) either goes directly back to experience, 
that is, the content of experiences, or it is at least 
indirectly connected with experience in such a way 
that it can be indicated which possible experience 
would confirm or refute it; that is to say, it is itself 
supported by experiences, or it is testable, or it has 
at least factual content. (Carnap 1928b, p. 328) 
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According to the project of unified science, although 
different sciences can reach their statements by using 
different methods of research, all scientific statements are 
the same kind of thing: a set of “true propositions about 
reality” (Schlick 1929, p. 140). Two important conse-
quences emerge from this claim. First, all scientific laws are 
of the same kind and, hence, they are all related, or 
“interwoven” as Neurath says (Neurath 1931/32, p. 283). 
Second, if all scientific statements are of the same kind, 
they are all expressible in the same language: there is a 
unified language (Neurath 1931/32, p. 284 and 293). This 
unified language is none other than the observational 
language from which all cognitively meaningful statements 
are logically deduced, and which is now identified by the 
logical positivists who talk about unified science with 
physicalist language, since it is the only language that is 
intersensual —i.e., not dependent upon a concrete sense—, 
and intersubjective —i.e., not dependent upon a concrete 
speaker (Neurath 1931/32, p. 287; cf., also Feigl 1934,  
p. 438). Note that if we are to assume that only physicalist 
language possesses these two features, then, since  
scientific statements are supposed to be objective and 
verifiable by —i.e., logically deduced from— observational 
language, the project of unified science offers a convincing 
argument for taking observational language to be a 
physicalist language.  
 
Hence, if the statements of a certain science are not 
logically deducible from this unified language, or if that 
science does not have the same predictive success as 
experimental sciences do, then we must conclude that it 
fails to produce cognitively meaningful statements. I am 
not saying that predictive success must be taken as a 
criterion for verifiability: what I am saying is that if physics 
has some sort of predictive success, then the other 
sciences must also have this —since they are, in the end, 
the same science. This explains Neurath’s efforts to try to 
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show that sociology has some sort of predictive success 
and that its statements can be translated, without any  
loss in meaning, into physicalist language (cf., Neurath 
1931a, p. 326 and 405; Neurath 1931/32, p. 302). It also 
explains the project of some logical positivists, mentioned 
previously, of offering a physicalist account of 
psychological language.  
 
Apart from Schlick, the other logical positivists did not 
concern themselves with the status of human sciences and 
the place they might occupy in this unified science. 
Schlick’s view was that if human sciences were to have a 
theoretical, cognitive goal, then their research method 
could not be different from the method used in 
experimental sciences. If the method was different it was 
because in such cases human sciences were not  
“[...] occupied in gaining knowledge and discovering real 
connections [...]” but in reaching some sort of emotive or 
aesthetic, non-cognitive goal (Schlick 1929, p. 151;  
cf., also Schlick 1926, p. 102).  
   
  
 
5. ETHICAL LANGUAGE 
 
 
 
In this section, I will examine how logical positivists 
analysed ethical language. As we will see below, we can 
distinguish two main approaches among the members of 
the Vienna Circle: either they took ethical language to be 
non-cognitive, purely emotive, or they took it to be 
cognitively meaningful by trying to reduce it to 
observational language. Leaving aside the adequacy of 
these emotivistic and reductionist approaches, I think that 
it is interesting to draw attention to how these attempts 
reveal that the members of the Vienna Circle were not 
completely insensitive to the importance of this kind of 
language in ordinary practical life. Schlick, for example, 
considered Socrates as the first “true philosopher” since he 
was “[...] one who sought the meaning of propositions, 
and particularly of those by means of which men mutually 
judge their moral conduct” (Schlick 1937, p. 496). 
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s comments on the mystical 
(Wittgenstein 1922/2002, §6.522) and Carnap’s 
recognition of the fact that questions that fail to satisfy the 
verifiability principle can still be important for practical 
situations even if they do not have any theoretical value 
(Carnap 1928a, p. 297), together with his distinction 
between object-representation and factual-representation 
(cf., Carnap 1928b, p. 329–331), can also be read in this 
way. 
 
The logical positivists who assumed that it was not 
possible to verify the existence of moral properties were 
committed to denying moral realism. But the denial of 
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moral realism is not, strictly speaking, a consequence  
of the verifiability principle: even in adopting the 
verifiability principle, one could accept moral realism if he 
were able to provide a method of verifying ethical 
judgments; and since verifiability refers here to logical 
deductibility from observational statements, this would 
imply that one could provide a naturalistic account of 
moral properties —i.e., their reduction to the 
observational. This last is precisely the route taken by the 
logical positivists who took ethical language to be 
cognitively significant.  
 
Those that treated ethical statements as cognitively 
meaningful embraced what Neurath called ‘felicitology’ 
(Neurath 1931/32, p. 305–307); that is, the view according 
to which ethics is to be reduced to “[...] questions of fact; 
why people hold the principles that they do, what is that 
they desire, and how their desires can be fulfilled” (Ayer 
1959, p. 21–22; cf., also Blumberg and Feigl 1931, p. 293; 
Neurath 1931a, p. 327–328 and 419; Neurath 1931b, p. 50; 
Neurath 1931/32, p. 305–307; Schlick 1930, p. 175; 
Schlick 1939). Thus, for example, an ethical claim such as 
‘It is morally right to take care of your children’ might be 
reduced to the empirical fact that in taking care of their 
children, people are usually fulfilling some of their desires 
and improving their own happiness. Since ethical language 
is to be reduced to observational, non-ethical language, 
these authors concluded that ethics could explain when 
something is valued, but it could not establish when 
something is valuable. In Schlick’s words:  
 
 [...] ethics [...] “justifies” a certain judgment only to 
the extent that it shows that the judgment 
corresponds to a certain norm; that this norm 
itself is “right”, or justified, it can neither show 
nor, by itself, determine. Ethics must simply 
recognize this as a fact of human nature. [...] In 
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other words: if, or in so far as, the philosopher 
answers the question “what is good?” by an 
exhibition of norms, this means only that he tells 
us what “good” actually means; he can never tell  
us what good must or should mean. (Schlick 1939, 
p. 256–257). 
 
Among logical positivists, Ayer was the one who, in 
chapter VI of his Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 
1946/1971), provided a more detailed emotivist account of 
ethical language. In his view, moral judgments did not 
concern matters of fact in so far as they neither described 
nor represented the world at all, but were merely emotional 
responses to it. Similarly, moral language had no cognitive 
meaning at all, since it only served to express non-cognitive 
states such as attitudes and feelings and, therefore, its 
statements could not be analysed in terms of truth and 
falsehood.  
 
These views are not without problems. The main 
problem of Schlick’s and Neurath’s felicific conceptions of 
ethics was already identified by Ayer. It does not seem  
self-contradictory to say that X causes the greatest 
happiness (or the greatest balance of pleasure over pain), 
but that X is not right. Thus, Ayer concludes, “[...] it 
cannot be the case that the sentence ‘x is good’ is 
equivalent to ‘x is pleasant’, or to ‘x is desired’.”  
(Ayer 1946/1971, p. 107). Emotivism, on the other hand, 
is founded on the assumption that there is a clear-cut 
distinction between the evaluative and the cognitive 
content of ethical language. One common way in which 
this assumption has been challenged is by appealing to the 
so-called ‘thick concepts’ —i.e., concepts with both 
evaluative and cognitive content. A typical example of  
a thick ethical concept is ‘courageous’: when I say that 
someone is courageous, I am not merely evaluating him 
positively but also describing him as a person who is  
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not afraid of taking risks. If, as some authors have  
argued (cf., e.g., Williams 1985/2006, pp. 128–131 and  
pp. 140–142; Putnam 2002, 34–35), the evaluative and the 
cognitive content of thick ethical concepts cannot be 
disentangled, then there is no room for an emotivist 
account of ethical language.4 
 
It goes far beyond the scope of this essay to analyse in 
detail the adequacy of these proposals. There is, though, an 
important point to bear in mind. Given the importance 
that ethics had in ordinary daily life, logical positivists 
could not simply bite the bullet here and claim that ethical 
language was completely meaningless, and so they were 
committed to providing some account of ethical language 
that was compatible with their acceptance of the 
verifiability principle. The success of neither of these two 
positions, however, is linked to the success of the 
verifiability principle, or vice-versa. This can be seen 
clearly in the later development of emotivism: leaving Ayer 
aside, the first serious attempt to formulate an adequate 
emotivist view of ethical language can be found in 
Stevenson (cf., especially Stevenson 1937; Stevenson 1944), 
who did not seem to be too concerned with the 
verifiability principle (cf., Stevenson 1938, p. 339–341, 
where he argues that the verifiability principle is an 
example of persuasive definition).  
                                                          
4 For an overview of how is going on nowadays the debate over 
thick concepts see the papers collected in (Kirchin 2013). 
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6. THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE 
VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE 
 
 
One of the main problems of the verifiability principle is 
that it is committed to accepting that universal statements 
—i.e., statements of the form ‘All As are P’— are 
cognitively meaningless, since they cannot be logically 
deduced from any finite set of observational statements 
(Hempel 1950, p. 112; Hempel 1965, p. 105). Although 
Schlick bit the bullet here and claimed that universal 
statements are not cognitively meaningful but are merely 
“prescriptions for the making of assertions” (Schlick 1931, 
p. 188), it seems clear that universal statements have some 
sort of cognitive meaning. The only way left for logical 
positivists to logically deduce a universal statement such as 
‘All As are P’ from a finite set of observational statements 
was to try to infer universality from regularity by assuming 
the premise of the uniformity of nature; this premise, 
however, cannot be logically deduced from our observa-
tional statements, since it is in turn a universal statement. 
 
Related to the problem of universal statements, we find 
statements involving modality. Since relations of modality 
cannot be logically deduced from observational statements, 
the verifiability principle would appear to have great 
difficulty distinguishing between ordinary universal 
statements (e.g., ‘All As are contingently P’) and statements 
expressing natural laws (e.g., ‘All As are (empirically) 
necessarily P’). As with universal statements, the only way 
left for logical positivists was to try to find a way to infer 
modality from regularity. But, again, this would require the 
premise of the uniformity of nature, which cannot be 
logically deduced from our observational statements 
because it is a universal statement.  
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Denying the cognitive meaning of universal statements 
made the idea of taking falsability instead of verifiability as 
a criterion for cognitive meaning attractive (cf. Ayer 
1936/37, p. 229; Ayer 1959, p. 13–14; Feigl 1969, p. 23). 
The canonical formulation of the falsability criterion can 
be found in Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery: to be 
cognitively meaningful, it must be possible for an empirical 
system “[...] to be refuted by experience” (Popper 
1935/2002, p. 96). However, not all logical positivists 
considered the possibility of accepting the falsability 
criterion. While Schlick seems to take falsability  
and verifiability to be symmetrical (Schlick 1937, p. 493), 
Neurath’s criticisms of falsability (Neurath 1935,  
p. 123–125) indicate that not all logical positivists take 
them to be so. At any rate, the important point is that 
while it is true that falsability can accommodate universal 
statements —since from a finite set of observational 
statements a universal statement can be falsified— it also 
has the odd consequence that existential statements —i.e., 
statements of the form ‘There is at least one A which is 
not P’— are rendered meaningless, since they cannot be 
falsified from a finite set of observational statements 
(Hempel 1965, p. 105; Neurath 1935, p. 124–125). As in 
the case of universal statements, the problem arises 
because it seems undeniable, at least intuitively, that 
existential statements have some sort of cognitive 
meaning. 
 
The verifiability principle ran into difficulties when 
accounting for dispositional properties, properties such as 
‘soluble’ and ‘fragile’. Given the verifiability principle, 
logical positivists were committed to reducing dispositional 
properties to their observable effects —i.e., to the 
observational statements that refer to them. And the 
trouble here is that an object can have a dispositional 
property even if it never manifests it —e.g., an object can 
be fragile or soluble even if it never gets broken or 
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dissolved. How this project of reducing dispositional 
properties to their observational effects can unravel is 
unclear, but obviously it cannot do so in the way Carnap 
proposed in his “Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936; 
Carnap 1937), which was the most serious attempt the 
logical positivists made in this sense. Carnap aimed to 
reduce dispositional properties to their observational 
effects through what he called ‘reduction sentences’. 
Taking the dispositional property of being soluble, Carnap 
states its corresponding reduction sentence as: 
 
 If any thing x is put into water at any time t, then, 
if x is soluble in water, x dissolves at the time t, 
and if x is not soluble in water, it does not. 
(Carnap 1936, p. 440–441)  
 
If successful, Carnap’s so-called reduction sentences 
would provide us with a way of reducing the subjunctive 
mode involved in dispositional properties to the indicative, 
extensional mode of observational language. The problem 
with Carnap’s proposal is, however, that reduction sen-
tences remain silent with regards to objects that are not 
put into water; and this means that reduction sentences 
cannot provide us with a complete reduction of disposi-
tional properties to the observational, unless we are going 
to claim that an object that would dissolve were it put into 
water is not soluble because it so happens that it is never 
put into water (cf., Hempel 1950, p. 119–120; and Hempel 
1965, p. 109–110 for criticisms to Carnap’s proposal). 
 
A last problem of the verifiability principle is its status: 
is it an analytical statement, a synthetic statement or a 
metaphysical claim? The verifiability principle is not an 
analytical statement because it is not true by virtue of its 
meaning: we can achieve full understanding of the 
verifiability principle and still doubt its truth. Neither is the 
verifiability principle a synthetic, cognitively meaningful 
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statement because it cannot be logically deduced from  
any set of observational statements. Thus, the only way  
left is to argue that the verifiability principle is a  
metaphysical, cognitively meaningless (pseudo)statement. 
Logical positivists, however, cannot accept this conclusion 
since, as Ayer points out, “[i]f the verification principle 
really is nonsensical, it states nothing; and if one holds that 
it states nothing, then one cannot also maintain that what 
it states is true” (Ayer 1989, p. 15; cf., also: Ayer 1934, 
p. 344). 
 
The only alternative left is to argue that the verifiability 
principle is a matter of convention, a working hypothesis 
justified on pragmatic grounds (cf., e.g., Cornelius Benjamin 
1941, p. 571–572). This was to be the route taken by those 
who, some years later, defended liberalised versions of the 
Verifiability Principle (cf., e.g., Reichenbach 1951, p. 93; 
Feigl 1963b, p. 311–313). However, in the Viennese 
formulation of the verifiability principle this way of 
reasoning is blocked: no pragmatic grounds can be  
offered for a theory of meaning which forbids what  
Feigl called “innocuous metaphysics” (Feigl 1963a, p. 42–
44) —e.g., the dissolution of the self, the commitment to  
a physicalist account of psychological language, the 
meaninglessness of universal statements (or existential 
statements, if we take falsability instead of verifiability as a 
criterion of meaning), the meaninglessness of the notion of 
an external world, the rejection of inductive reasoning, the 
requirement of unified science, and so on. To forbid 
innocuous metaphysics is too high a price to pay.  
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7. THE LIBERALISATION OF THE 
VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE:  
CARNAP’S CONFIRMABILITY 
 
 
In light of all these problems, by the mid 30’s it had 
become clear that the requirement of conclusive 
verifiability —i.e., logical deducibility from observational 
statements— was untenable and that the verifiability 
principle needed some sort of liberalisation in order to 
accommodate universal statements and dispositional 
properties (cf., e.g., Ayer 1959, p. 13–14; Carnap 1936, 
p. 425; Carnap 1949, p. 124; Ewing 1937, p. 348; 
Reichenbach 1938/1957, p. 188; Reichenbach 1951, 
p. 95–96; Will 1940, p. 185). The most serious attempt to 
liberalise the verifiability principle was Carnap’s 
confirmability criterion. For this reason, it is interesting to 
end this essay by explaining briefly what the core ideas of 
Carnap’s proposal were. 
 
In his “Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936; Carnap 
1937), Carnap suggested changing verifiability for 
confirmability: a statement is not completely verified but is 
confirmed to some degree upon the single instances, and the 
possibility of being confirmed to some degree is what 
assures that the statement is cognitively meaningful.  
 
Confirmability is a criterion for cognitive meaning, but 
not a criterion for truth; hence, neither is it a criterion for 
epistemic justification. For this reason, the degree of 
confirmability of the statement does not matter: we are 
concerned not with the truth of the statement, but with its 
meaningfulness. Once confirmability not having to be a 
criterion for truth was allowed (Carnap 1945, p. 530; 
Carnap 1949, p. 119–120; Tarski 1944, p. 345), so was the 
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meaning of a statement being distinguishable from the data 
that might confirm it —i.e., the meaning of a statement 
was not to be identified with its method of confirmation. 
This is the main difference between Carnap’s 
confirmability criterion and the Viennese formulation of 
the verifiability principle —as we have seen, the Viennese 
formulation identified the cognitive meaning of a 
statement with its method of verification. 
 
In contrast with the Viennese formulation of the 
verifiability principle, the confirmability criterion is 
understood as an inductive inference from observational 
statements. This explains Carnap’s interest in probability 
and inductive inference and his efforts to show that 
inductive inference is a procedure as logical as logical 
deduction (cf., Carnap 1945; Carnap 1946, p. 590–596). 
However, it is interesting to note that there were other 
proposals that aimed to liberalise the verifiability principle 
that did not make verifiability a logical notion: John Hick, 
for example, claimed that verifiability was, at least partially, 
a psychological notion (Hick 1960, p. 54–55). 
 
Carnap’s confirmability criterion allows us to skip one 
of the most obvious and serious objections to the 
verifiability principle: the problem of universal statements 
(Carnap 1936, p. 425). However, if, as Carnap does in his 
“Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936; Carnap 1937), we 
accept the confirmability criterion but still maintain the 
requirement of the reducibility of all cognitively 
meaningful statements to observational terms, then there 
remains the problem of dispositional properties and 
theoretical entities. The trouble, as I explained in relation 
to dispositional properties, is that Carnap’s so-called 
reduction sentences fail to provide an adequate reduction 
of dispositional properties to their observable effects. 
However, since theoretical entities and dispositional 
properties are fundamental in scientific practice, one 
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cannot simply claim that they are meaningless. However, 
without a successful reductionist account this is what the 
requirement of reducibility to the observational language 
amounts to. These considerations made Carnap give up his 
original aim of reducing all vocabulary to observational 
language (Carnap 1956, p. 39). 
 
In his later works (Carnap 1956, p. 49–52), Carnap 
returned to the idea already outlined in his “Foundations 
of Logic and Mathematics” (Carnap 1939, p. 67–69): a 
statement is confirmed when it allows us to make 
successful and observable predictions. This seems to 
preserve the link between meaning and experience and,  
at the same time, it seems to respect the meaningfulness  
of theoretical entities and dispositional terms: even if  
we cannot reduce them to observational language, we 
understand their meaning provided they are linked to 
sensory-experience through their observable effects. The 
point is that we can conclude that theoretical entities are  
of the same nature as observational entities provided  
they bear some relation with the observable (this is the 
main idea of Reichenbach’s so-called ‘extension rules’; 
cf. Reichenbach 1951, p. 100). 
 
So, in the end, Carnap’s confirmability criterion turns 
out to be some sort of abductive argument: the best 
explanation for predictive success is the reference of the 
theoretical entities employed in the derivation of the 
prediction. We can now clearly see the extent to which the 
criterion had been liberalised: remember that in the 
Viennese formulation of the Verifiability Principle, the 
only procedure allowed was logical deductibility from 
observational statements.  
   
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this essay I aim to reconstruct the classical formulation 
of the so-called verifiability principle, the characteristic 
claim of the philosophical movement now known as 
logical positivism.  
 
The verifiability principle is an empiricist criterion of 
meaning which states that only statements that are 
verifiable by —i.e., logically deducible from— 
observational statements are cognitively meaningful.  
 
At the beginning of this essay, I argue that a clear 
precedent of the philosophical position defended by 
logical positivists regarding both the verifiability principle 
and their conception of philosophy as the task of logical 
analysis, can be found in the works of classical empiricists 
such as Berkeley and Hume. The other main influence for 
logical positivism can be found in the studies of logic, 
especially those of Frege, Whitehead, Russell and 
Wittgenstein. 
 
I also compare the verifiability principle with 
operationalism and Jamesian pragmatism, two philosophi-
cal positions that might also be considered as empiricist 
criteria of meaning. I argue that operationalism and the 
verifiability principle are extremely similar, whereas the 
verifiability principle and Jamesian pragmatism seem to 
have nothing in common except that both aim to preserve 
the empiricist intuition that a statement not linked to 
experience is somehow vacuous.  
 
I identify three steps in the formulation of the verifi-
ability principle and I argue that the first two (i.e., identi-
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fying the cognitive meaning of a statement with the state 
of affairs described by it and identifying the state of affairs 
described by a statement with its truth-conditions) are 
quite intuitive and hard to dispute. However, these two 
steps do not imply the verifiability principle. I argue that it 
is the third step (i.e., identifying the truth-conditions of a 
statement with the conditions under which the description 
of a state of affairs is logically deducible from observa-
tional statements) that is the genuine claim of the 
verifiability principle.  
 
I comment on the debate among the members of the 
Vienna Circle about how to understand observational 
language, either as a physicalist language or as a perceptual 
language, and I argue that this debate reveals an important 
internal problem for those who want to adopt the 
verifiability principle as a criterion for cognitive meaning: if 
we take observational language to be a perceptual-
language, then we face the problem of solipsism and 
private language, and if we take it to be a physicalist 
language, apart from committing us to giving a physicalist 
account of psychological language which seems 
problematic, at least in the behaviouristic terms that some 
logical positivists used, leads us to reject the basic claim of 
empiricism that experience provides the foundations of 
our knowledge. 
 
I identify the two main consequences of accepting the 
verifiability principle: the conception of philosophy as the 
task of logical analysis and the project of unified science. I 
comment on logical positivists’ claim that the task of 
philosophy is not to construe systems or doctrines, but to 
dissolve traditional philosophical problems through 
clarifying and purifying our language. This task, we must 
remember, has a twofold dimension: first, the task of 
clarifying our concepts through logical analysis to dissolve 
all disputes that are merely verbal; and, second, the task of 
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identifying which sentences are cognitively meaningful by 
showing which ones satisfy the verifiability principle and 
which ones do not. The distinction is important because 
whereas the latter is dependent on the adequacy of the 
verifiability principle, the concern with clarifying our 
language and concepts is not, strictly speaking, related to 
it —actually, the pleasing legacy of logical positivism, if 
there is one, is this concern with clarifying our language 
and concepts, which is still, at least among analytic 
philosophers, taken as one of the main philosophical 
preoccupations. With regards to the project of unified 
science, the point I want to make in this essay is that it is a 
consequence, not a mere addenda, of the verifiability 
principle. 
 
I also comment on the two different views about 
ethical language held among the members of the Vienna 
Circle: emotivism and the so-called ‘felicitology’. I point 
out some of the main problems of these two views, but I 
argue that the success of neither is linked to the success of 
the verifiability principle, or vice-versa.  
 
Last, I comment on the main problems of the 
verifiability principle. In the mid 30’s, the severity of these 
problems led some logical positivists to liberalise the 
principle by giving up the conception of verifiability as 
logical deducibility and trying to make of it some sort of 
inductive inference from observational statements. To 
exemplify these liberalisation moves, I explain what the 
main ideas of Carnap’s use of confirmability as a criterion 
for cognitive meaning were, while leaving aside the debate 
about its adequacy. 
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